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One of the most pressing problems facing the economies of the
industrialized world is the fiscal solvency of their pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) social security systems.1 An important contributing factor to
this problem has been the recent drastic fertility declines in Western
Europe and Japan. What truly determines fertility, and what accounts
for the observed evolution in fertility behavior, are still open
questions. What is clear, however, is that, faced with a PAYGO social
security system, parents do not have the right incentives to choose a
fertility rate that is optimal. In such systems, each person's fertility
decision affects the economy's population growth rate and with it
everybody's pension benefits. Specifically, an increase in the rate of
population growth increases the number of future workers who will
have to support a retired person. No individual, however, takes thisimpact into account and that leads to a decentralized equilibrium
outcome with too few children.2
The above problem is exacerbated by another externality
associated with the “quality” of children, and their human capital
accumulation, through the education decisions of parents. The rate of
return of a pay-as-you-go system depends not just on the fertility rate,
but also on productivity growth. The more productive the children,
the higher will be their ability to produce and to pay taxes. This
reinforces the public good nature of a family's child-rearing activities.3
Most of the literature has thus far treated the quality and quantity
issues separately; or else have lumped the investments in quantity and
quality together as if one decision determines both.4 A basic
shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot distinguish between
child subsidies, which correct externalities emanating from fertility
decisions, and education subsidies which correct for externalities due tois “intergenerational transfer” effect, the literature has also noted
alled “capital dilution” effect: A higher fertility rate, given the
ved by the previous generation, implies a lower capital to labor
apita output; see Michel and Pestieau (1993) and Cigno (1993).
e quantity and quality effects, some economists have advocated a
nsion benefits (or contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices.
Abio et al. (2004), Bental (1989), Cigno et al. (2003), Fenge and
ar (1997), van Groezen et al. (2000, 2003).
03, 2008) are examples of this latter approach, while Cremer et al.
only with quantity decisions. See also Gahvari (2009).
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problem when the two types of externalities interact as they often do.
To be sure, there are a number of studies in the literature that
distinguish between quantity and quality decisions and study them
both in one unified framework. Peters (1995) is an early example of
this. In his model, both fertility and education choices are made
deterministically. The main shortcomings of his approach are the
deterministic nature of both quantity and quality decisions, and the
lack of any heterogeneity among parents. Cigno et al. (2003) also
allow for both fertility and quality. Fertility is fully deterministic, but
children's quality, which Cigno et al. define in terms of “lifetime tax
contributions”, is in part random and in part determined through
actions of parents. The limitations of their study come from the static
nature of their model, in looking at the decisions of the initial parent
only, and their not allowing for heterogeneity among parents.
Cigno and Luporini (2003), while building on Cigno et al. (2003),
allow for parents’ heterogeneity in terms of their ability to influence
their children's probability of success in life.5 However, their model
remains static innature as they toodonot gobeyond thedecisions of the
initial parents. In Meier and Wrede (2008) both fertility and types are
partly stochastic and partly determined by investments. The limitation
of their model comes from their ignoring the impact of fertility and
education investments on the distribution of types in the economy. But
this induced change in thedistribution of types constitutes an important
component of fertility and education externalities.6
The current paper addresses the quantity and quality questions in
an overlapping generations model with high- and low-ability
individuals. The unique feature of our study is its endogenous
determination of the distribution of types. Specifically, we allow for
this distribution to be affected by both education and fertility
decisions. This framework gives rise to three sources of externality.
First, there is the customary externality associated with the change in
average fertility—the intergenerational transfer effect. It arises from
the fertility decisions of parents. This source of externality disappears
if the pension system is a pre-funded one. The second source of
externality emanates from decisions that change the distribution of
types even if average fertility is kept constant. It arises from both
education decisions and fertility decisions. Its unique feature is that it
does not depend on the institution of social security and exists for pre-
funded systems as well. The third source of externality is due to
interaction between average fertility and the distribution of types. It
too arises from both education decisions and fertility decisions. It is
different from the second externality source in that it exists because of
the PAYGO institution and disappears if one moves to a pre-funded
system. It is also different from the first externality source because it
will not exist if the distribution of types were immutable.
One distinguishing element between quantity and quality deci-
sions is that of timing. One decides on the number of children quite
early; the quality of children, i.e. their future earning capacity, is
determined much later. We incorporate this timing sequence in our
two-period overlapping generations model by assuming a sequential
decision making process: At the end of the first-period, the young
decide on starting a family and having children first and then on the
extent of their children's education.
We assume that parents choose the number of their children
deterministically. It is true that the actual number of children in a
family does not necessarily coincide with the number that parents
initially intended to have.7 However, this choice is intrinsically more
deterministic and less susceptible to random and other shocks than5 They also drop Cigno et al.'s (2003) assumption that fertility is fully deterministic.
6 Sinn (2004) also considers a model that allows or both fertility and quality. In his
setup fertility is fully random and quality fully deterministic. However, Sinn is
interested more in examining the properties of a traditional PAYGO system rather than
the properties of an optimal pension plan.
7 Infertility, premature death, misplanning and multiple births are some of the
reasons explaining this gap.determining the quality of one's children. As to the quality, it is
unrealistic to expect that one can determine the future earning
abilities of one's children in a deterministic fashion simply by
investing in their education and training. We assume that quality is
determined by three factors. One is random; the second is due to
education; and the third is pre-determined by one's “genes” and
family background. Nevertheless all children of a particular parent
turn out to be either of high- or of low-ability.
Finally, we study the properties of an optimal pension system
assuming that intergenerational transfer of resources occur only
through the PAYGO scheme. This simplifies the analysis drastically by
allowing us to ignore the issues relating to the choice between PAYGO
and fully- or partially-funded pension systems. The determinants of
this choice are multi-dimensional and, given our focus on endogenous
fertility and education, any attempt to address this choice is bound to
be inadequate.82. The model
2.1. Preliminaries
Consider, within an overlapping generations framework, the
sequence of decisions a child has to face after he is born. First, upon
reaching adulthood, he has to decide on starting a family and having
children. Subsequently, as a parent, he has to decide on the extent of
his children's education. Finally, the retirement period arrives. Such a
rich model allows for children, adults, parents, and the retired
(grandparents) to overlap, requiring a four-period overlapping
generations model. However, analyzing a full-fledged four-period
model quickly becomes cumbersome and too detailed for developing
insights. We thus take a short cut and transform the four-period setup
we have in mind into a simple two-period overlapping generations
model. To do this we assume the decisions of having children and
educating them occur sequentially just prior to the beginning of one's
retirement. This saves us from having to distinguish between working
as an adult and working as a parent.
Assume each generation consists of two types of people; they
posses either a high or a low earning ability. Denote high- and low-
ability types by subscripts h and l and let j=h, l. All children of a
particular parent will turn out to be either of high- or of low-ability;
no mix of high- and low-ability children is possible. There are three
factors that determine if a child turns into a high- or a low-ability
individual. One is due education; the second is a random element; and
the third is pre-determined by one's “genes” and family background.
The effect of education on ability is, ceteris paribus, most certainly
positive. To introduce randomness into this process, we assume that
investing in education does not necessarily transform a child into a
high-ability type; instead, it only increases the probability of its
occurrence. Thus, when a j-type parent invests e “units” in educating
his child, the child will have a πj=πj(e) probability of turning out to be
of high-ability. Naturally, the probability that the child will be of low-
ability is 1−πj. We assume that πj(⋅) is an increasing and strictly
concave function with πj(0)N0.
The third factor, the child's family background, manifests itself
through the functional form of πj(e) and that is why the function is
indexed by j. Specifically, one would expect that πh(e)Nπl(e). That is,
for the same level of (formal) education, children of high-ability
parents have a higher chance of becoming more able. This reflects the
fact that high-ability parents tend to spendmore time reading to their8 One important question here is whether or not one should have a PAYGO system if
the rate of return to capital exceeds the population growth rate. In a stripped down
model such as ours, a PAYGO pension plan is undesirable unless the economy is
characterized by dynamic inefficiency. Although Weil (2008) has recently argued that
this possibility may arise even in advanced countries, we do not want to cope with this
issue.
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capital. To say more about the structure of πj(e), one needs to know
the precise nature of the interaction between (formal) education and
family background on a child's ability. Decompose πj(e) into two
distinct elements: an educational component π(e) and a family
background component represented by a parameter θj, with θlbθh. We
assume that the interaction between π(e) and θj is additive so that
πj=π(e)+θj.9 According to this formulation, the marginal produc-
tivity of spending e dollars on educating one's children is the same
regardless of the parent's type.10
Assume generation T consists of NT people. Denote the proportion
of high-ability persons in generation T by δT (0bδTb1) so that the
number of high-ability persons in generation T is δTNT. Parents choose
the number of the children they want to have and do so
deterministically. Denote the number of children each j-type parent
will have by nj. Thus δTNT high-ability parents of generation T end up
with (δTNT)nhπh high-ability children and (δTNT)nh(1−πh) low-ability
children. Similarly, (1−δT)NT low-ability persons of generation T end
up with (1−δT)NTnlπl high-ability children and (1−δT)NTnl(1−πl)
low-ability children. Consequently, the proportion of high-ability
children in the next generation will be
δT + 1 =
δTNTnhπh + 1−δTð ÞNTnlπl
δTNTnh + 1−δTð ÞNTnl
=
δTnhπh + 1−δTð Þnlπl
δTnh + 1−δTð Þnl
: ð1Þ
2.2. Steady state
In the steady state, δT+1=δT≡δ. It then follows from Eq. (1)
relating δT+1 to δT that
δnhπh + 1−δð Þnlπl
δnh + 1−δð Þnl
= δ: ð2Þ
Observe that δ is a weighted average of πh and πl and thus bracketed
by them. Moreover, Eq. (2) indicates that δ is homogeneous of degree
zero in (nl,nh). It follows from Euler's Theorem that
nh
∂δ
∂nh
+ nl
∂δ
∂nl
= 0: ð3Þ
It follows from this equation that ∂δ /∂nh and ∂δ /∂nl are of opposite
signs.
Let ej denote the j-type's investment in the education of his
children. Solve Eq. (2) for δ and write the solution as δ=δ(eh,el,nh,nl).
Introduce
Z ≡ 2δ nh−nlð Þ + nl 1 + πlð Þ−nhπh: ð4Þ
Differentiating Eq. (2) yields the following partial derivatives:
∂δ
∂eh
=
δnhπ′h ehð Þ
Z
; ð5Þ
∂δ
∂el
=
1−δð Þnlπ′l elð Þ
Z
; ð6Þ
∂δ
∂nh
=
δ πh−δð Þ
Z
; ð7Þ9 Observe that in this case θlbθh≤1−π(e).
10 Alternatively, one can posit a multiplicative relationship between π(e) and θj so
that πj=θjπ(e) (with θlbθh≤1/π(e)). This assumption states that the marginal
productivity of spending e dollars is higher for the more able parents. Its main import
is to enhance the educational investment of high-ability parents relative to low-ability
ones. Otherwise, it has similar implications for the nature of externalities. In an earlier
version of the paper, we explored this issue as well.∂δ
∂nl
=
1−δð Þ πl−δð Þ
Z
: ð8Þ
We prove in Appendix A that a necessary condition for the stability of
steady state solution for δ, namely |∂δT+1/∂δ
T
|b1, is that ZN0. Thus,
assuming a stable steady state implies that ZN0 so that
∂δ
∂eh
N 0; and
∂δ
∂el
N 0:
2.3. Laissez faire
To establish a benchmark, we start by studying the properties of
laissez faire equilibrium of the economy. Individuals have preferences
over consumption when young, c, consumption when retired, d, and
the number of children, n. They also care about the quality of their
children. We represent this by assigning a higher weight to the
subutility for children if they turn out to be of high-ability. Specifically,
the preferences of a j-type parent for having i-type children are
represented by
Uj = u cj
 
+ v dj
 
+ γiφ nj
 
; ð9Þ
where γhNγ l with γh−γ l indicating the strength of preferences for
higher-ability children. Under this circumstance, given the partly
stochastic nature of children ability, each j-type will have an ex-ante
expected utility depending on the outcome of his investment in
children. Setting γ l=1, and γh=γN1, we have
EUj = u cð Þ + v dð Þ + πjγφ nð Þ + 1−πj
 
φ nð Þ
= u cð Þ + v dð Þ + 1 + γ−1ð Þ π eð Þ + θj
 h i
φ nð Þ:
ð10Þ
Assume each j-type person earns an income equal to βjI when
young, where βhNβl.11 Without any loss of generality, set βl=1 and
βh=βN1. Denote the non-education cost of raising a child by a and
the “quantity” of education provided to a child by e. Choose the units
of measurement for c,d, and e such that their producer prices are one.
The young individual spends a portion of his income on his immediate
consumption, c, a portion on raising his children, an, and another
portion on educating his children, en. He saves the rest of his income
receiving a rate of return equal to r. Upon retirement, the individual
receives and spends all his savings plus interest, leaving no bequests.
Denote the rate of interest by r. The budget constraint for the j-type
is given by
βjI = cj +
dj
1 + r
+ ejnj + anj: ð11Þ
The j-type young individual chooses cj,dj,nj, and ej to maximize his
utility (Eq. (10)) subject to his budget constraint (Eq. (11)). This
problem is summarized by the Lagrangian
L = u cð Þ + v dð Þ + 1 + γ−1ð Þ π eð Þ + θj
 h i
φ nð Þ
+ μ βjI−c−
d
1 + r
−n a−e n
 
:
ð12Þ11 We assume that I does not depend on the economy's capital stock. In this sense,
our overlapping generations model is of Samuelson's (1958) variety rather than
Diamond's (1965).
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nj, the laissez faire solutions for these variables are found from
v′ dj
 
u′ cj
  = 1
1 + r
; ð13Þ
π′ ej
 
u′ cj
  = nj
γ−1ð Þφ nj
  ; ð14Þ
φ′ nj
 
u′ cj
  = a + ej
1 + γ−1ð Þ π ej
 
+ θj
  ; ð15Þ
βjI = cj +
dj
1 + r
+ nj a + ej
 
: ð16Þ
At this level of generality, the effect of a higher level of income on
educational investment is not clearcut. There are different forces at
work. Consequently, one cannot determine which type invests more
in education or has more children.12
The results of this section are summarized as
Proposition 1. Consider an overlapping generations model in the steady
state with two types of people in each generation: high- and low-ability.
Each type receives an income commensurate with his ability when young
and has preferences over consumption during working years and
retirement, as well as the number of children he will have and their
ability type. Each type can have children of either ability. The probability
of having a high-ability child depends positively on investment in
education and is higher, ceteris paribus, for high-ability parents. Then:
(i) Investment in education by either type of parents increases the
proportion of high-ability persons in the steady state, δ.
(ii) Increasing the number of children increases δ for one type of
parents and decreases it for the other.
(iii) The laissez faire solution is found from Eqs. (13)–(16).
3. Utilitarian first best
Denote the population growth rate by
n≡ δnh + 1−δð Þnl: ð17Þ
The economy's resource constraint in the steady state is then written
as
1 + β−1Þδð Þ½  I ≧ δ ch + nh a + ehð Þ +
dh
nP
 
+ 1−δð Þ cl + nl a + elð Þ +
dl
nP
 
:
ð18Þ
Thus the consumption of the retired is financed from taxes imposed
on the young as in a pay-as-you-go retirement system. In what
follows, we simplify our analysis by concentrating on the steady state
equilibrium, ignoring the welfare of generations who live on the
transitional path from one steady state to another. This approach is
equivalent to assuming that the government's social welfare function
is defined over unweighted average utilities of all current and future12 If parents care about having children but not about their ability types, the
ambiguity goes away. This is a special case of our model in which γ=1. Under this
circumstance, one can easily see that the solution for education expenditures requires
e=0. This is not surprising given that education is costly to the parent but bestows no
utility upon him. Observe also that in this case, the first-order condition (15) will be
simplified to φ′(nj) /φ′(nj)=a. One can then show that, given strong separability and
concavity of all subutility functions, c,d, and n are all normal goods so that chNcl,dhNdl,
and nhNnl.generations. Clearly, the extent of redistribution across generations is
susceptible to this particular choice of social welfare function.
3.1. The problem and its solution
Using the economy's resource constraint (18), the government's
optimization problem is summarized by the Lagrangian
o = δ u chð Þ + v dhð Þ + 1 + γ−1ð Þ π ehð Þ + θhð Þ½ φ nhð Þf g
+ 1−δð Þ u clð Þ + v dlð Þ + 1 + γ−1ð Þπ elð Þ + θl½ φ nlð Þf g
+ μf 1 + β−1Þδ½ I−δ ch + nh a + ehð Þ + dhnP
 
− 1−δð Þ cl + nl a + elð Þ +
dl
nP
 g;
ð19Þ
leading to the following first-order conditions with respect ch,cl,dh
and dl:
∂o
∂ch
= δ u′ chð Þ−μ½  = 0; ð20Þ
∂o
∂cl
= 1−δð Þ u′ clð Þ−μ½  = 0; ð21Þ
∂o
∂dh
= δ v′ dhð Þ−
μ
n
h i
= 0; ð22Þ
∂o
∂dl
= 1−δð Þ v′ dlð Þ−
μ
n
h i
= 0: ð23Þ
Manipulating these conditions yields
ch = cl = c; and dh = dl = d:
3.2. Externalities due to education and having children
Introduce
D≡ ∂o∂δ = 1 + γ−1ð Þ π ehð Þ + θhð Þ½ φ nhð Þ− 1 + γ−1ð Þπ elð Þ + θl½ φ nlð Þ
+ u′ cð Þ β−1ð ÞI− nh a + ehð Þ−nl a + elð Þ½  +
nh−nlð Þd
n2
 
:
ð24Þ
Observe that D shows the change in social welfare due to an increase
in the proportion of high-ability persons in the population so that it
must be positive.13With ch=cl and dh=dl, the first bracketed term on
the right-hand side of Eq. (24) shows the net change in utilities. The
second bracketed expression shows the net change in resources; i.e.
the increase in the available resources minus the extra resources
required in consumption.14 Using the definition of D and the previous
findings that ch=cl=c, dh=dl=d, and μ=u′(c), one can write the
first-order conditions for the maximization of social welfare with
respect to nh,nl,eh, and el as
∂o
∂eh
= δ γ−1ð Þφ nhð Þπ′ ehð Þ−nhu′ cð Þ½  + D
∂δ
∂eh
= 0; ð25Þ
∂o
∂el
= 1−δð Þ γ−1ð Þφ nlð Þπ′ elð Þ−nlu′ cð Þ½  + D
∂δ
∂el
= 0; ð26Þ13 Being a proportion, this is matched by a reduction in the proportion of low-ability
persons.
14 This term arises only in conjunction with pensions. A change in δ changes
n = nl + δ nh−nlð Þ, the number of future working people who support a retired
person under a PAYGO pension plan.
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∂nh
= δ 1 + γ−1ð Þ π ehð Þ + θhð Þφ′ nhð Þ− a + eh−
d
n2
 	
u′ cð Þ
 
+ D
∂δ
∂nh
= 0;

ð27Þ
∂o
∂nl
= 1−δð Þ 1 + γ−1ð Þ π elð Þ + θlð Þ½ φ′ nlð Þ− a + el−
d
n2
 	
u′ cð Þ
 
+ D
∂δ
∂nl
= 0:
ð28Þ
Investing in education raises the probability of one's children to be
of high-ability. To the extent that parents prefer to have high-ability
children, this increases their utility as measured by (γ−1)φ(nj)π′(ej).
At the same time, investment in education is costly. Spending ej to
educate each of one's children imposes a utility cost of u′(c)nj on the
parent. Thus the first expression in Eqs. (25) and (26) shows the net
private benefit of investment in education. The second expressions in
these equations reveal the existence of an externality represented by
D
δ
∂δ
∂eh
for increasing eh; ð29Þ
D
1−δ
∂δ
∂el
for increasing el: ð30Þ
This externality arises through the effect of ej on δ. Moreover, given
that ∂δ /∂ejN0 and DN0, this is a positive externality.
The externality terms (29)–(30) coming through δmay be divided
into two parts. One is due to the direct change in δ as ej changes.When
there is an increase in the proportion of high-ability persons in the
population, matched of course by a reduction in the proportion of
low-ability persons, social welfare changes by the difference in the
utilities of high- and low-ability types and the change in the net
resources (income minus consumption). This effect does not work
through fertility; it is present also in the absence of PAYGO pension
plans when all second-period consumptions are financed by private
savings. The second part, on the other hand, works through changing
average fertility. Its existence depends on having a PAYGO pension
plan in place. It arises indirectly as the change in δ changes n as well.
Remember that n depends on δ and δ depends on ej (as well as nj). This
change in n is also neglected in private calculations. With
n = nl + δ nh−nlð Þ, this effect depends on the difference between nh
and nl. The various terms in D represent these two direct and indirect
externalities. The latter is captured by the nh−nlð Þd= n2 term that
appears in the definition of D, and the former by the remaining
expressions therein.
Similarly, increasing nj has externalities of its own. When a j-type
individual increases his fertility rate, he does not take the effect of his
decision on n into consideration. He thus perceives the effect
of increasing nj in his net welfare to consist of an increase in his
utility, [1+(γ−1)πj]φ′(nj), minus an increase in his expenditures on
nj, measured by (a+ej)u′(c). Comparing this with the expressions in
Eqs. (27) and (28) reveals the existence of externalities represented
by15
d
n2
u′ cð Þ + D
δ
∂δ
∂nh
for increasing nh; ð31Þ
d
n2
u′ cð Þ + D
1−δ
∂δ
∂nl
for increasing nl: ð32Þ
The externalities associated with nj, as depicted by expres-
sions (31)–(32), consist of two distinct elements. While the first
element has no counterpart in the externalities associated with ej, the
second element is identical in nature to the externality coming from15 The term d = n2 is present only in conjunction with pensions.ej. The term d= n
2 represents the first element and captures the effect
of increasing nh or nl on n, and through it on the aggregate resources
available for distribution between the young and the old under
PAYGO. Specifically, this externality tells us that increasing fertility
increases the number of future working people who support a retired
person. This is the familiar positive “intergenerational transfer” effect
that appears in the literature on growthwith endogenous fertility; see
Cigno (1993) and Michel and Pestieau (1993). The second externality
source, represented by the second expressions in Eqs. (31)–(32), is
due to the change in δ. It is the same type of externality discussed
previously in relation to the effect of ej on δ. The crucial point is that
these externalities emanate from a change in δwhich can come about
from a change in either nj or ej. This is why each of the second
expressions in Eqs. (31)–(32) is identical to its counterpart in Eqs.
(29)–(30) except that ∂δ /∂nh and ∂δ /∂nl have replaced ∂δ /∂eh and
∂δ /∂el. Finally, observe that with DN0, this externality source is
positive if ∂δ /∂njN0 and is negative if ∂δ /∂njN0. Recall also that ∂δ /
∂nh and ∂δ /∂nl are of opposite signs; hence one ability type exerts a
positive externality, and the other a negative externality, on the
society through their fertility decisions when mediated through δ.
The results thus far in this section are summarized as
Proposition 2.
(i) Under the utilitarian first-best solution with PAYGO, the number
of children that high- and low-ability parents have and the
amounts of investment they make in the education of their
children are characterized by Eqs. (25)–(28).
(ii) Investing in education of children by either type of parents
bestows a positive externality on everybody else. This externality
has two components, one of which exists only in the presence of
PAYGO pension plans.
(iii) A parent's fertility choice imposes two kinds of externalities on
everyone else. One is the familiar positive externality known as
“intergenerational transfer” effect. The other emanates from a
change in the proportion of high-ability children. This externality
too has two components, one of which exists only in the presence
of PAYGO pension plans.
3.3. Who should have more children and invest in education?
One interesting question concerns the relative size of nh to nl, and
eh to el; that is, which type should have more children and which type
should invest more in education. To examine this question, substitute
the expressions for ∂δ /∂nh and ∂δ /∂nl from Eqs. (7)–(8) into
Eqs. (27) and (28) and simplify. Then subtract one equation from
another to get
1 + γ−1ð Þπh½ φ′ nhð Þ− 1 + γ−1ð Þπl½ φ′ nlð Þf g− eh−elð Þu′ cð Þ +
D
Z
πh−πlð Þ = 0:
ð33Þ
To see the intuition behind Eq. (33), consider a concomitant
increase in nh and a reduction in nl. On the one hand, this
changes the utilities of the two types of parents by [1+(γ−1)πh]φ′
(nh)− [1+(γ−1)πl]φ′(nl). On the other hand, there will be an
increase in resource cost to the economy because educational
expenditures increase by eh−el which is worth (eh−el)u′(c) in
terms of utilities. This should be subtracted from the utility benefit.
Additionally, there is a gain to the economy through the externalities
that emanate from a change in δ. This is measured by the last
expression in Eq. (33).
The above relationship tells us that at the optimum the sum of all
themarginal effectsmust be zero. However, Eq. (33) does not allow us
to determine which type should have more children. The source of
this ambiguity is in the fact that fertility rates and educational
1277H. Cremer et al. / Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 1272–1279investment levels move in opposite direction. We elaborate on this
point below.
Divide Eq. (25) by (26) and substitute the expressions for ∂δ /∂eh
and ∂δ /∂el from Eqs. (5) to (6) in the resulting equation. Simplifying
yields
μnhnl π′ ehð Þ−π′ elð Þ½  = γ−1ð Þπ′ ehð Þπ′ elð Þ nhφ nlð Þ−nlφ nhð Þ½ : ð34Þ
It follows from the concavity of π(⋅) that the left-hand side of Eq. (34)
has the same sign as (el−eh). Similarly, concavity of φ(⋅) implies
that the right-hand side of Eq. (34) has the same sign as (nh−nl).
Consequently, at the first-best, (eh−el) and (nh−nl) are of opposite
signs. That is, those parents who have a higher number of children
should invest less in their education. That these two decisions go in
opposite directions cause an ambiguity in determining which type of
parents should have more children and which type should invest
more in education. This ambiguity disappears in the special case when
parents care only for the number of children they have but not their
type. Under this circumstance, the decisions on fertility and education
do not run in opposite directions. One can then show that under the
utilitarian first-best solution with PAYGO: (i) Both types of parents
invest equally in education; (ii) High-ability parents have more
children; (iii) Increasing the fertility rate of high-ability parents
increases the proportion of high-ability children in the economy and
bestows a positive externality on everybody else; and (iv) Increasing
the fertility rate of low-ability parents, reduces the proportion of high-
ability children and imposes a negative externality on everybody else.
See Cremer et al. (2010).
3.4. Decentralization
As observed earlier, we assume that second-period consumption
levels are financed through the PAYGO pension system. This requires
the government to impose a one-hundred percent tax on savings and
their returns. Recall also that the optimum requires equal consump-
tion levels for the two ability types both during working years and
retirement. Consequently, the government must provide everyone
with the same pension P=dh=dl=dwhere d is evaluated at its first-
best value. Next, to induce the correct choice of fertility and education,
two types of subsidies are required. One is a subsidy on education at
the rate τj for the j-type, the other is a direct child subsidy to the j-type
equal to tj dollars per child. Finally, first-period lump-sum taxes, Tj, are
required to ensure that consumption levels during working years are
the same for both types. Below, we show how these instruments
decentralize the first-best allocations.
Given these instruments, pensions are fixed and parents decide
only on their first-period consumption, fertility, and children's
education. Let αj denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the budget constraint of a j-type parent. The optimization problem of
this parent is summarized by the Lagrangian expression,
Lj = u cj
 
+ 1 + γ−1ð Þ π ej
 
+ θj
 h i
φ nj
 
+ αj βjI−cj−nj a−tj
 
− 1−τj
 
ejnj−Tj
h i
:
The first-order conditions are
∂Lj
∂cj
= u′ cj
 
−αj = 0; ð35Þ
∂Lj
∂ej
= γ−1ð Þφ nj
 
π′ ej
 
−αj 1−τj
 
nj = 0; ð36Þ∂Lj
∂nj
= 1 + γ−1ð Þ π ej
 
+ θj
 h i
φ′ nj
 
−αj a−tj + 1−τj
 
ej
h i
= 0:
ð37Þ
The question one needs to examine is how to set the tax rates such
that the solution to the individual's first-order conditions (35)–(37)
above coincide with the first-best solution (c,e
j
,n
j
) from Eqs. (20)–
(28).
First, compare Eq. (36), using Eq. (35), with Eqs. (25) and (26).
This tells us that education costs must be subsidized at a rate equal to
τh =
D
u′ cð Þ
1
δnh
∂δ
∂eh
; ð38Þ
τl =
D
u′ cð Þ
1
1−δð Þnl
∂δ
∂el
; ð39Þ
where c is set at its first-best value. To understand the intuition behind
Eqs. (38) and (39), note that the algebraic expressions in these
equations are precisely the externality terms that come into play
through δ as eh and el change. The equations then tell us that at the
optimum the subsidy rates on education must equate their marginal
externality benefits. Observe also that with ∂δ /∂ehN0,∂δ /∂elN0, and
DN0, Eqs. (38)–(39) tell us that τhN0 and τlN0. These results make
sense and are due to the positive effect of investment in education on
the proportion of high-ability persons in the economy.
Second, compare Eq. (37), using Eq. (35), with Eqs. (27) and (28).
We will have
th + τheh =
d
n2
+
D
u′ cð Þ
1
δ
∂δ
∂nh
; ð40Þ
tl + τlel =
d
n2
+
D
u′ cð Þ
1
1−δ
∂δ
∂nl
; ð41Þ
The left-hand sides of Eqs. (40) and (41), th+τheh and tl+τlel, show
the net subsidy given to an h-type and to an l-type parent for each of
his children. The right-hand sides of Eqs. (40) and (41) consist of the
two externality sources described previously; they both are present
when nh and nl change. These equations thus tell us that, at the
optimum, we should subsidize the cost of having a child by an amount
equal to its net externality benefit.
Recall that the cost of raising and educating a child is a+ej. A child
subsidy of t dollars per child reduces this cost. Similarly, a subsidy to
education reduces this cost but through lowering the price of one
particular element of it, namely, education cost. Thus a subsidy to
education is also a subsidy to children. The difference is that the
education subsidy lowers the share of education cost in total cost. On
the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two
sources of costs.
With either ∂δ /∂nh or ∂δ /∂nl being positive, Eqs. (40) and (41)
tell us that at least one of the two expressions th+τheh or tl+τlelmust
be positive. That is, at least one of the two h- or l-type parents receive
a net subsidy for each of their children. The other parent type, on the
other hand, may receive either a net subsidy or a net tax depending on
the relative size of the two expressions on the right-hand side of
Eqs. (40) and (41).
Finally, substituting first-best values for τh and τl from Eqs. (38)
and (39) into Eqs. (40) and (41) yield first-best values for th and tl. We
have
th =
d
n2
+
D
u′ cð Þ
1
δ
∂δ
∂nh
− eh
nh
∂δ
∂eh
 	
; ð42Þ
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d
n2
+
D
u′ cð Þ
1
1−δ
∂δ
∂nl
− el
nl
∂δ
∂el
 	
; ð43Þ
where c,ej and nj are set at their first-best values. These equations do
not allow us to determine the signs of th and tl. Indeed, either one or
both can be positive (i.e. a subsidy) as well as negative (i.e. a tax).
Finally, to ensure that the two types will have identical
consumption levels during working years, one has to set first-period
lump-sum taxes such that both individual types spend the same
amount of money on c. It follows from the j-type parent's budget
constraint that Tj must be set equal to
Tj = βjI−nj a−tj
 
− 1−τj
 
ejnj−c; ð44Þ
where τj and tj are given according to Eqs. (40)–(43) and ej,nj, and c
are set at their first-best values.
The following proposition summarizes our results on decentralization.
Proposition 3.
(i) In the first-best, the parent type who has more children should
invest less in education.
(ii) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be
subsidized at a rate equal to the externalities they bestow to
everyone as given by expressions (38)–(39).
(iii) Let tj denote the direct child subsidy to a j-type parent in dollars.
Its value must be set according to Eqs. (42)–(43). Both th and tl
can be subsidies as well as taxes.
(iv) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the cost
of raising children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a subsidy to
fertility. The difference is that the education subsidy lowers the
share of education cost in the total cost. On the other hand, a
subsidy to children is “neutral” between the two sources of costs.
(v) Denote the subsidy rate on education investment for the j-type by
τj. Net subsidies to children are then equal to tj+τjej. Theymust be
set equal to the net externalities associated with increasing nj as
shown by expressions (40) and (41). At least one of the two
expressions th+τheh or tl+τlel must be positive. That is, at least
one of the two h - or l-type parents receive a net subsidy for each of
their children; the other parent type may receive either a net
subsidy or a net tax.
4. Concluding remarks
In discussing PAYGO pension plans, models with endogenous
fertility have emphasized the positive externality that each person's
fertility decision bestows on everybody by increasing everybody's
pension benefits through a higher population growth rate. This type of
externality, it has been argued, may be internalized through child
subsidies. Similarly, models with endogenous human capital forma-
tion have emphasized the positive externality of investing in
education of one's children (because parents cannot expropriate the
children's extra earnings due to parents’ education expenditures). The
same argument has been put forward in cases when parents build
their own human capital which they subsequently pass on to their
children. These types of externalities may be internalized through
education subsidies.
In this paper, we have combined the different externality sources
to learn what their interactions teach us about the combination of
child and education subsidies one must use to internalize them both.
We have also been concerned with the question of heterogeneity of
parents and how this may come into play in connection with
externality-correcting policies. This is particularly relevant when
child and education subsidies change the distribution of parent types.To this end, the paper has modeled endogenous fertility and human
capital formation in an overlapping generations framework wherein
every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the
proportion of types being determined endogenously. We have found,
among other results, that:
(1) Investing in education of children by either type of parents
increases the proportion of high-ability children in the
economy and bestows a positive externality on everybody
else. This externality has two components, one of which is
specific to PAYGO pension plans.
(2) Increasing the fertility rate of one type of parents increase the
proportion of high-ability children in the economy and bestows
a positive externality on everybody else. An increase in the
fertility rate of the other type reduces the proportion of high-
ability children and imposes a negative externality on every-
body else.
(3) The ambiguity in determining which parents impose a positive
externality, and which ones a negative externality, by having
more children is due to the fact that the type who has more
children invests less in education.
(4) Direct child subsidies and education subsidies both reduce the
cost of raising children. Thus a subsidy to education is also a
subsidy to fertility. The difference is that the education subsidy
lowers the share of education cost in the fertility subsidy. On
the other hand, a subsidy to children is “neutral” between the
two sources of costs.
(5) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must
always be subsidized because they entail positive externalities.
(6) Direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be
negative; i.e., they can be taxes.
(7) Net subsidies to children of a particular parent type (direct
child subsidies plus education subsidies) must be set equal to
the net externalities associated with increasing the fertility rate
of that type. Net child subsidies to at least one type of parents
must be positive; net child subsidies to the other type can be
positive or negative.
As a final observation, we remind our readers that our study has
been conducted in a first-best environment. Although the main thrust
of our observations should carry over to second-best environments
wherein educational investments and/or types are not publicly
observable, other interesting issues would also surface. We have left
the examination of these other issues to a subsequent paper.
Appendix A
Proof of 2δ(nh−nl)+nl(1+πl)−nhπhN0: Rewrite Eq. (1) as
δT + 1 =
δTnhπh + 1−δTð Þnlπl
δTnh + 1−δTð Þnl
≡ f δT ;nh;πh;nl;πlð Þ: ðA1Þ
The steady state value of δ is found from
δT + 1 = f δT ;nh;πh;nl;πlð Þ;
δT + 1 = δT = δ:

Differentiating δ totally with respect to πh yields
dδ
dπh
=
∂f
∂δT
dδ
dπh
+
∂f
∂πh
: ðA2Þ
Then one finds dδ /dπh from Eq. (A2) as
dδ
dπh
=
∂f = ∂πh
1−∂f = ∂δT
: ðA3Þ
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∂δT + 1
∂πh
=
∂f
∂πh
=
δTnh
n
: ðA4Þ
Substituting from Eq. (A3) into Eq. (A4) yields
dδ
dπh
=
δTnh = n
1−∂f = ∂δT
;
or, alternatively,
dδ
deh
=
dδ
dπh
θπ′ ehð Þ =
δTnhθπ′ ehð Þ
n 1−∂f = ∂δT½ 
: ðA5Þ
Comparing the expressions for dδ /deh as given by Eq. (A5) above and
Eq. (7) derived in the text tells us that the denominator in Eqs. (7) and
(8) is equal to the denominator of Eq. (A5). That is,
Z ≡ 2δ nh−nlð Þ + nl 1 + πlð Þ−nhπh = n 1−∂f = ∂δT½ :
Now if ∂ f /∂δTb0, then 1−∂ f /∂δTN0⇒ZN0. On the other hand, if ∂ f /
∂δTN0, the stability condition |∂δT+1/∂δT|=|∂ f /∂δT|b1 implies that
1−∂ f /∂δTN0 and we again have ZN0. 5
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